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Targeted Economic Sanctions in Light of the Hong 
Kong Autonomy Act and U.S.-China Tensions 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the twenty-first century, the United States has 
popularized the use of targeted economic sanctions to encourage foreign 
governments and financial institutions to further U.S. foreign policy 
goals.1  Compared to traditional sanctions, targeted sanctions intend to 
limit humanitarian costs and third country impacts by holding individual 
leaders and political elites accountable for intolerable or uncooperative 
behaviors.2  Thus, as trade tensions with China have intensified over the 
past few years, with China’s passing of The Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region3 (“HKSAR Security Law”) on June 30, 2020, the 
use of targeted sanctions was a natural response.4  China’s 
implementation of the HKSAR Security Law is seen as a direct violation5 
of the 1985 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom 
 
1. See Elizabeth Rosenberg et al., The New Tools of Economic Warfare: Effects and 
Effectiveness of Contemporary U.S. Financial Sanctions, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC. 5 (2016), 
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-new-tools-of-economic-warfare-effects-and-
effectiveness-of-contemporary-u-s-financial-sanctions [https://perma.cc/5J3X-VGF6] (“The 
United States has had a long history with economic coercion, and in the years since 9/11, 
financial sanctions in particular have taken a prominent role in national security strategy.”).   
2. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative?, 
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Feb. 23, 2000), 
https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/targeted-sanctions-policy-alternative 
[https://perma.cc/CPQ2-GLG7] (noting that targeted measures can include arms embargoes, 
travel bans, and asset freezes). 
3. English Translation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, XINHUANET (July 1, 
2020, 12:50 AM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/01/c_139178753.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H8FW-ZSTN] [hereinafter HKSAR Security Law].  
4. See Karen Yeung, How the US Uses the Dollar Payments System to Impose Sanctions 
on a Global Scale, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 25, 2020, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3098691/how-us-uses-dollar-
payments-system-impose-sanctions-global [https://perma.cc/3733-QWYV] (republished on 
Yahoo Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-uses-dollar-payments-system-
093000191.html [https://perma.cc/9KY2-WSL6]) (discussing how the U.S. dollar’s 
dominance has popularized the use of sanctions beginning with the Clinton administration). 
5. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., R46473, CHINA’S 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR HONG KONG: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2020) (referring to 
China’s Security Law as a violation of the Joint Declaration). 
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of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (“Joint 
Declaration”).6  China is using the HKSAR Security Law to unify China.7  
Further, the HKSAR Security law ends the “one country, two systems”8 
policy that has governed China’s relationship with Hong Kong.9  To 
leaders in the U.S., China’s action is an erosion of Hong Kong’s 
democratic autonomy.10  In response to the HKSAR Security Law, the 
U.S. passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (“HKAA”) on July 14, 
2020.11  
 
6. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and The Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of 
Hong Kong, UK-China, Dec. 19, 1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter The Joint Declaration]. 
The Joint Declaration is a legally binding treaty signed between the United Kingdom and 
China in 1985 and registered with the U.N. that was part of a planned transition of Hong 
Kong’s sovereignty from the UK to China. LOUISE BROOK-HOLLAND, HOUSE OF COMMONS 
LIBR., No. 08616, HONG KONG: THE JOINT DECLARATION 2 (2019) (UK). The Joint Declaration 
declared China would “resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 
1 July 1997.” The Joint Declaration, supra, at 61. 
7. The area which is modern day Hong Kong was “ceded to Great Britain” under 
agreements between Great Britain and China after the First and Second Opium Wars (1842 
and 1860 respectively). LOUISE BROOK-HOLLAND, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., supra note 6. 
Great Britain obtained Hong Kong in 1898 on a ninety-nine-year lease and ruled over Hong 
Kong until 1997, when the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration went into effect. Id. 
8. The “one country, two systems” policy is the implicitly derived key term of the 1984 
Sino-British Joint Declaration. BROOK-HOLLAND, supra note 6, at 1. “One country, two 
systems” refers to the treaty requirements that Hong Kong would be under the authority of 
China but would still be able to “enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and 
defense affairs.” The Joint Declaration, supra note 6, at 61. Under the Treaty, Hong Kong 
autonomy includes being “vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power 
[with final adjudication],” retaining freedom of speech and individual rights, and maintaining 
the HKSAR as a capitalist financial center. The Joint Declaration, supra note 6, at 61–62. 
These rights were to be recorded in a Basic Law of KHSAR and “remain unchanged for 50 
years.” The Joint Declaration, supra note 6, at 62. 
9. Luo Huining, Liaison Off. of the Cent. People’s Gov’t in the HKSAR, Speech at The 
Launch Ceremony of Events Marking the 23rd Anniversary of Hong Kong’s Return to the 
Motherland (July 1, 2020), http://www.locpg.gov.cn/jsdt/2020-07/01/c_1210684535.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5GES-WA7N] (China); see also LAWRENCE & MARTIN, supra note 5, at 1 
(“The [People’s Republic of China] and HSKAR governments portray the law as a necessary 
measure to close national security ‘loopholes’ in HKSAR law, to move Hong Kong from 
‘turmoil to stability’ after a year of sometimes violent protests, and to rebalance the ‘one 
country, two systems’ formal to emphasize ‘one country.’”).  
10. See LAWRENCE & MARTIN, supra note 5, at 1 (“The law is widely seen as undermining 
the HKSAR’s once-high degree of autonomy and eroding the rights promised to Hong Kong 
in the 1984 Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong . . . .”). 
11. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, 134 Stat. 663 (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EH-
PV6K]. 
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In the past, targeted sanctions have been credited as a success in 
countries like Iran because the sanctions exploited power asymmetries 
between the U.S. and the targeted country.12  The strength of the U.S. 
dollar and access to U.S. financial markets have made it easier for Foreign 
Financial Institutions (“FFIs”) and ally countries to align with U.S. 
foreign policy goals.13  However, now that the U.S. is using sanction laws 
such as the HKAA to put financial pressure on China, enforcing the 
sanctions is less effective, especially when many financial institutions 
might feel pressure to choose between two dominant global economies.14  
In addition, FFIs and U.S. financial firms are increasingly drawn to 
China’s untapped capital market15 and long-term investment growth 
prospects.16  The potential penalties FFIs face under the HKAA might not 
be strong enough to pull these institutions away from China.17   
Further, the U.S. government’s primary purpose in imposing 
these sanctions is to encourage democracy over a communist system, as 
China has held onto a one system, two-country principle that has 
 
12. See Suzanne Katzenstein, Dollar Unilateralism: The New Frontline of National 
Security, 90 Ind. L. J. 293, 306–07 & 343 (2015) (noting that the U.S. targeted sanctions by 
relying on U.S. market power in international trade to exploit asymmetries between 
governments in the foreign sector).  
13. Id. at 343. 
14. See Andrew Rennemo, With China Sanctions, America Pushes the Limits of Its 
Financial Power, THE DIPLOMAT (June 19, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/with-
china-sanctions-america-pushes-the-limits-of-its-financial-power/ [https://perma.cc/83Y4-
RN3T] (“[T]he United States risks harm to its sanctions tool, longstanding alliances, and 
ultimately its geopolitical position if its posture remains one dimensional and overly 
coercive.”). 
15. See Nicholas R. Lardy and Tianlei Huang, Despite the Rhetoric, US-China Financial 
Decoupling is Not Happening, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (July 2, 2020, 11:15 AM), 
https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/despite-rhetoric-us-china-financial-
decoupling-not-happening [https://perma.cc/S8M3-5QZT] (noting that China’s financial 
services market is estimated at $47 trillion). In addition, FFIs occupy “less than 2 percent of 
the banking assets [markets] and less than 6 percent of the insurance market.” Id. 
16. In 2020, China has eased restrictions allowing FFIs easier entry into Chinese markets. 
See Crystal Tai & Jing Yang, Wall Street Moves Into China, Despite Tech and Trade Battles, 
WALL ST. J. VIDEO (Oct. 7, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/video/wall-street-moves-
into-china-despite-tech-and-trade-battles/111C45E3-B196-491B-9C83-
0D697C889625.html [https://perma.cc/2X2J-D487]. Notably, the Chinese government no 
longer requires a majority ownership in FFIs in China. Id. Several firms have taken advantage 
by greatly expanding operations in China in 2020, including JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs. 
Id. See generally Jonathan Woetzel et al., China and the World: Inside the Dynamics of a 
Changing Relationship, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. (2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-
insights/china/china-and-the-world-inside-the-dynamics-of-a-changing-relationship 
[https://perma.cc/Q85P-YX8A] (discussing the economic prospects in China over this 
century). 
17. Tai & Yang, supra note 16.  
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gradually deteriorated over the past twenty years.18  The passage of the 
HKAA has revealed how disconnected U.S. foreign policy goals and 
perceptions of China are from financial institutions’ and companies’ 
investment targets.19  Thus, by choosing to implement economic 
sanctions against China, the U.S. could divide financial institutions from 
ally countries, undermine its position as a global financial power, and risk 
isolating itself from global economic markets in the long-term.20  
This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II provides a brief 
description of the key provisions impacting financial institutions and the 
legislative purpose behind the HKAA and its accompanying executive 
order.21  Part III explores the impact of using the HKAA to target China 
and additional compliance requirements imposed on financial institutions 
to avoid HKAA penalties.22  Part IV discusses the future implications of 
the overuse of economic sanctions by the U.S., specifically regarding 
how FFIs might “de-risk” from the U.S.23  Part V concludes by 
summarizing and providing a suggestion for how the U.S. should shift its 
perspective and strategy toward China going forward.24 
II.  BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE HONG KONG AUTONOMY ACT 
The HKAA25 was enacted on July 14, 2020, in response to 
China’s passage of the HKSAR Security Law,26 which gave China 
executive and judicial power over the people of Hong Kong, violating the 
 
18. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, § 3, 134 Stat. 663 (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EH-
PV6K]. 
19. See, e.g., Bruce Einhorn, U.S. Businesses in China Not Heeding Trump’s Call to Return 
Home, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2020, 12:19 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-09/u-s-businesses-in-china-not-heeding-
trump-s-call-to-return-home?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/7L27-MVB2] (noting 
disconnect exists since U.S. companies remain interested in China for business despite the 
executive branch’s insistence that they return operations to the United States). 
20. See infra Part II-IV. 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See infra Part III.  
23. See infra Part IV.  
24. See infra Part V. 
25. Hong Kong Autonomy Act (“HKAA”), Pub. L. No. 116-149, 134 Stat. 663 (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EH-
PV6K]. 
26. HKSAR Security Law, supra note 4. 
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promises contained in the Joint Declaration.27  Despite this bilateral 
agreement between the United Kingdom and China,28 the U.S. Congress 
passed the HKAA, imposing sanctions on “foreign persons involved in 
the erosion of certain obligations of China with respect to Hong Kong 
[via the Joint Declaration], and for other purposes.”29  Sanctions are 
imposed on any “foreign person” (“Person”)30 that the Secretary of State 
deems “is materially contributing to, has materially contributed to, or 
attempts to materially contribute to the failure of the Government of 
China to meet its obligations under the Joint Declaration or the Basic 
Law.”31  A Person, which is defined as an individual or entity, “materially 
contributes” if the Person committed an action which resulted in 
restrictions on Hong Kongers’ personal freedoms, ability to participate in 
democratic outcomes, or on the high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong.32 
The Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury (“Treasury 
Secretary”) also can recommend the sanctioning of a financial institution 
that “knowingly conducts a significant transaction with a foreign person” 
who has materially contributed to the demise of Hong Kong democratic 
values.33  The HKAA does not specifically define “foreign financial 
institution”; the statute only defines “financial institution” to mean those 
 
27. Under the Security Law Legislation, China suspended many legal rights granted to the 
people of Hong Kong. HKSAR Security Law, supra note 4. It also gave China broad power 
to imprison people for “acts of secession or subversion of state power,” in light of the protests 
to maintain Hong Kong Autonomy. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. 43413, 43413 (July 
14, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-
presidents-executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization [https://perma.cc/4NGH-BRSL]; 
see also The Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 61. 
28. In 2019, after the Hong Kong protests began, the UK Foreign Office answered a public 
question regarding the Joint Declaration on its website: “[i]f at some stage in the future we 
were to take the view that China had breached its 
obligations under the Joint Declaration, this would, under international law, be a bilateral 
matter between us and China and we would pursue it accordingly.” BROOK-HOLLAND, supra 
note 6, at 4 (quoting FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, UK PARLIAMENT, No. UIN 
266293, HONG KONG: EXTRADITION (June 18, 2019), https://questions-
statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2019-06-18/266293 
[https://perma.cc/AE5F-ZYQS]). Also, note that the Joint Declaration does not contain any 
enforcement or dispute provisions; a breach is assumed to be a suspension of the operation of 
the treaty under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises. LOUISE BROOK-HOLLAND, 
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., supra note 6, at 3. 
29. HKAA § 1, 134 Stat. at 663. 
30. HKAA § 2(5), (10), 134 Stat. at 664.  
31. HKAA § 5(a), 134 Stat. at 669. 
32. HKAA § 5(g), 134 Stat. at 671. Personal freedoms used in the HKAA means “freedom 
of assembly, speech, press, or independent rule of law.” Id.  
33. HKAA § 5(b), 134 Stat. at 669. 
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referenced in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2).34  Accordingly, under the HKAA 
and 13 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2), a financial institution involves activities from 
a range of entities, including FDIC-insured banks, credit unions, currency 
exchanges, insurance companies, and U.S. banks operating 
internationally.35 Thus, the HKAA could apply to any financial 
institution—foreign or U.S.—involved in a transaction with a Person 
identified.36  
Further, the financial institution must “knowingly conduct[] a 
significant transaction.”37  Although the HKAA does not define 
“significant transaction,”38 “knowingly” is defined as “actual knowledge 
of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.”39  In addition, transactions 
under the sanctions described include loans from U.S. financial 
institutions40 and other banking transactions.41  Considering the broad 
authority granted to the Secretary of State, the President, and relevant 
federal agencies,42 determining whether an FFI knowingly conducts a 
 
34. HKAA § 2(6), 134 Stat. at 664 (“The term ‘financial institution’ means a financial 
institution specified in section 5312(a)(2) of Title 31, United States Code.”).  
35.  HKAA § 2(6), 134 Stat. at 664; 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)–(Z). Application to U.S. 
financial institutions operating internationally is further supported by the HKAA definition of 
“financial institution” which is defined under 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R): "[A] Licensed 
sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the transmission of funds, 
including any person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system or any 
network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically 
or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system.” 31 U.S.C. § 
5312(a)(2)(R). 
36. HKAA § 4(3), 134 Stat. at 668 (“[T]he United States should establish a clear and 
unambiguous set of penalties with respect to foreign persons determined by the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to be involved in the contravention 
of the obligations of China under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and the financial 
institutions transacting with those foreign persons.”).  
37. HKAA § 5(b), 134 Stat. at 669. 
38. HKAA § 2, 134 Stat. at 663–64. 
39. HKAA § 2(9), 134 Stat. at 664. 
40. HKAA § 7(b)(1), 134 Stat. at 672 (“The United States Government may prohibit any 
United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the foreign 
financial institution.”).  
41. HKAA § 7(b)(5), 134 Stat. at 672 (“The President may . . . prohibit any transfers of 
credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, 
to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
and involve the foreign financial institution.”).  
42. HKAA §§ 4(3)–(5), 5(d), 6(a), 134 Stat. at 668–671. 
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significant transaction will likely be “inherently discretionary and highly 
fact-specific.”43 
Once a Person or FFI is identified by the Secretary of State, the 
President imposes the sanctions.44  For Persons found to materially 
contribute under the HKAA, the sanctions could include restrictions on 
transactions in and holding property in the U.S.,45 exclusion from the 
U.S., and revocation of visas and travel documentation.46  However, 
many financial analysts have questioned the impact on Persons 
sanctioned since the penalties will likely have minimal financial harm 
since access to loans and investments is easily attainable in China.47  This 
is especially true if the Persons do not own property in the U.S. or have 
investments in U.S. currency.48 
Compared to sanctions imposed on Persons, the HKAA imposes 
much heavier penalties on FFIs and requires U.S. financial institutions 
and agencies to enforce these penalties.49  Ten possible sanctions may be 
imposed with respect to FFIs for violating the HKAA: 
 
43. Duncan A. W. Abate & Tamer A. Soliman, The Hong Kong Autonomy Act, MAYER 
BROWN (July 17, 2020), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-
events/publications/2020/07/the-hong-kong-autonomy-act [https://perma.cc/S42Z-PLNY]. 
44. HKAA § 6-7, 134 Stat. at 671–72. 
45. HKAA § 6(b)(1), 134 Stat. at 671 (“The President may . . . prohibit any person from–
(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, withdrawing, transporting, or 
exporting any property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with respect 
to which the foreign person has any interest; (B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege with respect to such property; or (C) conducting any transaction involving such 
property.”) (emphasis added). 
46. HKAA § 6(b)(2), 134 Stat. at 671. 
47. See Sum Lok-kei & Enoch Yiu, Hong Kong Slams US’ Autonomy Act, Urges 
Washington to Refrain from Measures that Could Affect Financial Institution Operations, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST (June 26, 2020, 11:30 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/politics/article/3090799/local-observers-believe-us-senates-hong-kong-autonomy-act 
[https://perma.cc/N5VP-5JHY] (suggesting that the HKAA sanctions specifically target 
individuals to limit “wiping out everyone” with the sanctions because a broader scope would 
harm the U.S.’s own economy). A more recent article discusses how the White House has 
limited its offensive foreign policy measures on China—led by the globalist Treasury 
Secretary Steven Mnuchin—to avoid actions “that could rock the global economy.” Bob 
Davis, Kate O’Keeffe, & Lingling Wei, U.S.’s China Hawks Drive Hard-Line Policies After 
Trump Turns on Beijing, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2020, 12:50 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-s-china-hawks-drive-hard-line-policies-after-trump-turns-
on-beijing-11602867030?st=6ffmvd427b4p4lx [https://perma.cc/44FG-LCUQ]. 
48. Chi Wang, US Sanctions and Hong Kong Autonomy Act are Empty Gestures that Show 
a Failure to Understand, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 4, 2020, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3091713/us-sanctions-and-hong-kong-
autonomy-act-are-empty-gestures-show [https://perma.cc/FP4P-53TZ]. 
49. HKAA § 7, 134 Stat. at 671–72. 
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(1) The U.S. Government may prohibit any U.S. financial 
institution from making loans or providing credits to 
the FFI.  
(2) Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York may designate, or permit the continuation 
of any prior designation of, the FFI as a primary 
dealer in U.S. Government debt instruments. 
(3) The FFI may not serve as agent of the U.S. 
Government or serve as repository for U.S. 
Government funds.  
(4) The President may . . . prohibit any transactions in 
foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the U.S. and involve the FFI.  
(5) The President may . . . prohibit any transfers of credit 
or payments between financial institutions or by, 
through, or to any financial institution, to the extent 
that such transfers or payments are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. and involve the FFI.  
(6) The President may . . . prohibit [activities associated 
with] any property subject to the jurisdiction of the 
U.S. and . . . which the FFI has any interest.  
(7) The President, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Commerce, may restrict or prohibit exports, 
reexports, and transfers (in-country) of commodities, 
software, and technology subject to the jurisdiction of 
the U.S. directly or indirectly to the FFI. 
(8) The President may . . . prohibit any U.S. person from 
investing in or purchasing significant amounts of 
equity or debt instruments of the FFI.  
(9) The President may direct the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Treasury Secretary and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, to exclude from the 
U.S. any alien that is determined to be a corporate 
officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a 
controlling interest in, the FFI subject to regulatory 
exceptions. 
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(10) The President may impose on the principal executive 
officer or officers of the foreign financial institution, 
or on individuals performing similar functions and 
with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any 
of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through 
(8) that are applicable.50 
 
The HKAA first allows the President to impose at least five of these 
sanctions; then, the President can impose all of the above sanctions if 
expanded sanctions are deemed necessary.51   
Finally, the President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong 
Normalization (“Executive Order”) was issued with the enactment of the 
HKAA on July 14, 2020.52  Part of the Executive Order expands on the 
types of sanctionable actions by individuals who disrupt Hong Kong’s 
autonomy.53  The Executive Order also grants authority for implementing 
sanctions to the Treasury Secretary, divisions within the Department of 
the Treasury (“Treasury”)—including the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (“OFAC”)54—and the Secretary of State.55  Finally, the 
Executive Order includes several provisions that reduce the special status 
of Hong Kong.56 
Section nine of the HKAA states that the President’s authority 
and his granting of implementation authority under the executive order is 
 
50. HKAA § 7(b), 134 Stat. at 672–73. 
51. HKAA § 7(a), 134 Stat. at 671–72. 
52. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. 43413 (July 14, 2020), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-presidents-
executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization [https://perma.cc/4NGH-BRSL]. 
53. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43415. 
54. OFAC is a division of the U.S. Department of the Treasury that manages economic and 
trade sanctions related to U.S. foreign policy goals. Office of Foreign Assets Control - 
Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-control-sanctions-programs-
and-information [https://perma.cc/ZJ5C-48P4] (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (“The Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the US Department of the Treasury administers and 
enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals 
against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, 
those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”).  
55. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43416–17. 
56. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43414–15. These additional provisions include 
revoking export license exceptions for Hong Kong, removing preference for Hong Kong 
passport holders, suspending extradition arrangements with Hong Kong, and terminating 
certain tax agreements. Id. 
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provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(“IEEPA”).57  IEEPA was enacted in 197758 and gives the executive 
branch broad discretion to oversee “any interest of any foreign country or 
national thereof.”59  Likewise, the Executive Order legally authorizes the 
Secretary of State and Treasury Secretary—including OFAC—to 
designate Persons in violation of the HKAA, implement the Executive 
Order,60 and maintain a list of Specifically Designated Nationals and 
Blocked Persons (“SDN List”).61   
Finally, although the HKAA is an attempt to maintain the 
autonomy of Hong Kong and uphold the obligations established 
 
57. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43413.; see also Hong Kong Autonomy Act, 
Pub. L. No. 116-149, § 9(a), 134 Stat. 663, 677 (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EH-PV6K] (“The President may exercise 
all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this Act.”). 
58. CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE  2 (2020). The IEEPA 
stemmed from the Passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) originating in 1917. 
Id. at 2–3. Both the IEEPA and the TWEA “sit[] at the center of the modern U.S. sanctions 
regime. Id. at i. 
59. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (“[T]he President may, under such regulations as he may 
prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise . . . investigate, block during the 
pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, 
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation 
or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or 
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has 
any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States.”); see also CASEY, ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R45618, at 44 (noting that the 
phrase “any interest of any foreign country or national thereof” grants the executive branch 
broad discretion and “[t]he interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few 
major transactions in which a foreign interest is not involved”). 
60. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43417 (“The Secretary of the Treasury, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including 
adopting rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA as may be 
necessary to implement this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with 
applicable law, redelegate any of these functions within the Department of the Treasury.”); 
see also HKAA § 5(a), 134 Stat. at 669 (“[T]he Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, determines that a foreign person is materially contributing to, has 
materially contributed to, or attempts to materially contribute to the failure of the Government 
of China to meet its obligations under the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law, the Secretary 
of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report. . 
.”). 
61. Hong Kong-Related Sanctions Frequently Asked Question No. 848, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY—OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/848 
[https://perma.cc/6MDQ-DRD2]; see also Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43417 
(“The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these 
functions within the Department of the Treasury [OFAC].”). 
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previously by Congress62 in the Hong Kong Policy Act of 199263 and the 
Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019,64 the purpose of 
the HKAA is ultimately to further a foreign policy agenda against 
China.65  First, section three of the HKAA provides multiple examples of 
China’s gradual overstepping of the autonomy of Hong Kong over the 
past twenty years.66  Section three concludes by indicating that the HKAA 
is a response to “deep[] concern[] [about China’s actions] to the people 
of Hong Kong, the U.S., and members of the international community.”67  
However, section four of the HKAA and the Congressional 
Record provide insight into a broader agenda for implementing the 
HKAA.68  First, the HKAA’s underlying purpose is to maintain the “one 
country, two systems” regime in Hong Kong,69 despite recognizing that 
China had already resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong as of July 1997 
and has taken numerous actions to solidify its sovereignty during the 
2000s.70  Ultimately, the HKAA is about sending “a larger signal to 
China.”71  The U.S. legislators’ intent is to use the HKAA to compel 
financial institutions to impose penalties and respond to “escalation of 
aggression by the Chinese Communists.”72  The HKAA implements 
 
62. HKAA § 4(1), 134 Stat. at 667–68. 
63. United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 66 U.S.C. §§ 5701–5732. 
64. Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, 66 U.S.C. §§ 5725–5726 
(adding two sections and amending § 5721 of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992).  
65. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE AND MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., R46473, CHINA’S 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR HONG KONG: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2020); see also 116 
CONG. REC. S4179 (daily ed. July 2, 2020) (statement of Sen. Boozman) (discussed further in 
next paragraph). 
66. See, e.g., HKAA § 3, 134 Stat. at 664–67. 
67. HKAA § 3(16), 134 Stat. at 667. 
68. HKAA § 4, 134 Stat. at 667–68. 
69. HKAA § 4(2), 134 Stat. at 668. 
70. See HKAA § 3(9)–(15), 134 Stat. at 665–68 (listing several counts of administrative 
action China has asserted over Hong Kong, including passing extradition laws, passing 
education laws to “mainlandize” Hong Kong schoolchildren, and taking other enforcement 
action against freedom of speech in Hong Kong).  
71. 116 CONG. REC. S4179 (daily ed. July 2, 2020) (statement of Sen. Boozman). 
72. Id.  (“That is part of why the Hong Kong Autonomy Act is so important. It is not only 
an effort to shield freedom loving Hongkongers from this continuing escalation of aggression 
by the Chinese Communists, but the bill is a larger signal to China. It is a message that the 
United States and the free world are no longer willing to look past some of the worst behavior 
that has been occurring. It is a message that our patience has run out.”); see also HKAA § 4, 
134 Stat. at 668. The HKAA hopes to put pressure on foreign persons and financial institutions 
transaction with foreign persons to establish a multilateral sanctions regime; however, as 
discussed later, attempts at this multilateral sanctions regime is really forced coercive 
diplomacy to encourage allies to side with the U.S. and put pressure on China, in light of the 
current U.S.-China economic tensions. HKAA § 4, 134 Stat. at 668. 
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economic sanctions to emphasize the power of a democratic political 
model over communism.73  In the context of the HKAA, communism is 
described as “the dark shadows of the authoritarian governments that are 
constantly pushing to systematically erode, corrode, and wrap the values 
and freedoms that we cherish.”74  Although economic sanctions have 
been popular throughout the twenty-first century regarding countries 
such as Russia and Iran,75 using financial institutions to exert pressure 
and gain multilateral support will be more challenging under the HKAA, 
especially when the central goal is to target China.76 
III.  FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION RESPONSE TO HKAA 
The HKAA sanctions exemplify a common foreign policy tool 
used by the U.S. government in modern times.77  Compared to traditional 
trade sanctions, which overtly target the economy of an entire country, 
targeted sanctions attempt to prevent specific individuals or entities from 
accessing financial systems.78  The underlying goal of these sanctions—
such as those imposed by the HKAA—is to influence FFIs connected to 
the targeted actor by exploiting the power of the dollar as the global 
currency.79  Typically, the targeted sanctions and the severe punishment 
for non-compliance effectively give financial institutions limited or no 
choice but to comply with the HKAA.”80  However, this choice to comply 
is not as easy when the underlying target country is China.81   
 
73. See 116 CONG. REC. S4179 (discussing stopping the spread of communism as the 
intentions and purpose of passing the Hong Kong Autonomy Act at multiple points throughout 
the record).  
74. Id. 
75. See generally ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5–6 (discussing the ongoing debate 
about the effectiveness of sanctions and evidence of coercive impact on foreign countries). 
76. Wang, supra note 48. 
77. See generally ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 19–26 (summarizing several cases 
of economic sanctions since 2002, which includes Iran, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela); see 
also Kathy Gilinan, A Boom Time for U.S. Sanctions, THE ATL. (May 3, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/why-united-states-uses-sanctions-so-
much/588625/?utm_source=share&utm_campaign=share [https://perma.cc/63CD-DVU5] 
(beginning in the early 2000s, the use of targeted economic sanctions has become the “policy 
instrument of choice” for the U.S. government).  
78. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 11. 
79. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 312. 
80. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (describing compliance with sanctions less as a 
choice and more of a requirement) (“abide by the sanctions or risk severe consequences”).  
81. Stephen Morris & Katrina Manson, Mike Pompeo Renews Attack on HSBC as Bank 
Walks Line Between US and China, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://on.ft.com/3jhHPTz 
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A.         Historical FFI Response to Sanctions  
The most recent historical comparisons to the HKAA sanctions 
were those imposed on Iran through the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 201082 and on Russia through the 
Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014.83  Like the HKAA, the 2010 
sanctions on Iran targeted specific individuals, forcing compliance 
through a difficult choice between “maintaining ties to certain designated 
entities and protecting their access to U.S. banks.”84  These sanctions 
leveraged FFIs’ access to the U.S. capital markets, typically required for 
cross-border transactions.85 
In the past, some banks decided that the potential lost profit from 
violating the U.S. sanctions outweighed the loss from the imposed 
penalties.86  For example, banks may determine that the penalty is less 
than the net revenue gained from interacting with sanctioned individuals 
or markets.87  Often this was due to failure to enforce the penalties.88  
However, since the Iran sanctions in 2010, the Treasury has penalized 
several FFIs—including Credit Suisse, Dutch Bank ING, Standard 
Chartered, HSBC, and BNP Paribas89—in an amount totaling more than 
$11 billion in fines.90  Most notably, the Treasury fined HSBC $1.9 
billion in 2013 and BNP Paribas $8.9 billion for interacting with 
 
[https://perma.cc/5DVG-MGZQ]; Rebecca Isjwara et al., Global Banks in Hong Kong Brace 




82. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 8501–8551. 
83. Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, 22 U.S.C. §§ 8921–8930. 
84. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 317. 
85. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 11; Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 318. 
86. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (arguing that financial sanctions incentivize 
banks to act illicitly since the cost-benefit of engaging with sanctioned individuals outweighs 
the enforcement action).  
87. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10. 
88. See Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 321 (explaining, in the context of Iran, “[f]or years 
on end, these banks flagrantly violated these regulations by conducting illicit transactions with 
Iran. They likely calculated that the profits from illicit transactions outweighed the risks and 
costs of getting caught”).  
89. Jamie Robertson, Are Europe’s Banks Being Prosecuted—or Persecuted?  ̧BBC (June 
30, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28021000 [https://perma.cc/BBN6-
YWXM]; see also Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 320 (citing the specific amounts of the 
settlement agreements between these banks and the Treasury).   
90. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10. 
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sanctioned individuals from a targeted country.91  Despite some banks 
risking the penalty, most FFIs have complied with the U.S. targeted 
sanctions to avoid reputational and financial costs associated with 
violations.92   
B.         Financial Institutions Must Choose a Side  
Within the past ten years, banks have typically complied with 
U.S. sanctions because the sanctions forced “a stark and costly choice” 
between conducting business in the U.S. and the targeted country’s 
financial market.93  However, China is a very different economic target 
compared to other recent targets of U.S. Sanctions—Iran and Russia.94  
When the U.S. targeted both Iran and Russia, choosing access to U.S. 
financial markets over the Russian or Iranian markets was an easier 
choice for banks.95  First, both Russia and Iran's economies are primarily 
driven by one commodity: oil and gas.96  When the U.S. imposed targeted 
sanctions on Iran in 2010, mineral fuels, oils, and derivative products 
made up 80% of Iran’s export economy—with crude petroleum 
comprising 69% of that total.97  Similarly, when the U.S. imposed 
sanctions on Russia in 2014, minerals dominated the Russian trade 
economy, with crude petroleum, refined petroleum, and petroleum gas 
accounting for over 61% of its exports.98  Finally, both the Iranian and 
 
91. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 320–21. 
92. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10. 
93. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 319. 
94. See Rennemo, supra note 14 (“China’s size and integration with the world economy, 
while highly imperfect, is too advanced for purely punitive diplomacy to work.”); Gilinan, 
supra note 77. 
95. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 319. 
96. Russia Yearly Exports in 2014 Chart, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, 
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus [https://perma.cc/Z6RE-WXQ2] (scroll down to 
“Yearly Exports”; then on the Yearly Export chart settings, set “depth” to “HS2” and “year” 
to “2014) (last visited Sept. 21, 2020) [hereinafter “Russia 2014”]; Iran Yearly Exports in 
2010 Chart, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, 
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/irn [https://perma.cc/LUB8-3P4D] (scroll down to 
“Yearly Exports”; then on the Yearly Export chart settings, set depth to HS2 and year to 2010) 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2020) [hereinafter “Iran 2010”]. 
97. THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY (Iran 2010), supra note 96 (noting that data 
is retrieved from International Trade Database at the Product Level, BACI, 
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=37 [https://perma.cc/HB7G-
HYUS] (last visited Sept. 21, 2020)). 
98. THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY (Russia 2014), supra note 96. 
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Russian economies pale in comparison to the U.S. economy.99  Iran’s 
$487 billion GDP was dwarfed by the U.S.’ $14.99 trillion GDP in 
2010.100  In 2014, Russia’s $2.06 trillion was asymmetrical to the U.S.’s 
$17.52 trillion market value.101 
Despite Russia and Iran’s smaller market opportunity and 
economic dependence on a single commodity, policy scholars have 
questioned the effectiveness of the modern targeted sanctions in 
effectuating economic harm.102  Other scholars have questioned the 
government aggregation measures, which exaggerate sanctions' 
effectiveness by failing to consider other factors outside of U.S. sanctions 
implementation.103  Further, the impacts on Russia and Iran could have 
resulted from collapsing oil prices and internal mismanagement rather 
than U.S. sanctions imposition alone.104  Sanctioned countries like Russia 
have learned to adapt to a “new normal”105 under these economic 
sanctions, turning the U.S. sanctions imposed on their countries into an 
opportunity for domestic policies and internal economic growth.106  Due 
 
99. GDP in Current U.S. Dollars 2010, THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=map&year=2010 
[https://perma.cc/8KFD-QW6F] (set chart year to 2010, then scroll down to data table below 
the world chart) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2010]; GDP in Current U.S. Dollars 
2014, THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=map&year=2014 
[https://perma.cc/8KFD-QW6F] (set chart year to 2014, then scroll down to data table below 
the world chart) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2014]. 
100. THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2010, supra note 99. 
101. THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2014, supra note 99. 
102. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 18 (finding that targeted sanctions have 
minimal impact on a country’s GDP growth, but instead elevate investor’s perceptions of risk 
toward engaging with the sanctioned country). Despite findings of short-term effectiveness of 
sanctions due to their correlation with investor’s risk perceptions, Rosenberg warns that “[o]ur 
definition of sanctions’ effectiveness is predicated on the notion that sanctions alone generally 
cannot change regime behavior and must be used and evaluated along with other tools of 
national power, such as military force, diplomacy, cyber capabilities, and intelligence 
activities.” Id. at 19–20. 
103. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12 (citing Eugene Gholz & Llewleyn Hughes, 
Market Structure and Economic Sanctions: the 2010 Rare Earth Elements Episode as a 
Pathway Case of Market Adjustment, R. OF INT’L POL. ECON. (2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1693411 [https://perma.cc/JRF3-QASY]).  
104. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12 (citing Jay Solomon & Summer Said, Why 
Saudis Decided Not to Prop Up Oil, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2014, 10:33 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-saudis-decided-not-to-prop-up-oil-1419219182 
[https://perma.cc/P6HA-ZQZM]).  
105. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12 (quoting Glen Biglaiser & David Lektzian, The 
Effect of Sanctions on US Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT’L ORG. 531–551 (2011)). 
106. Henry Foy, Russia: Adapting to Sanctions Leaves Economy in Robust Health, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://on.ft.com/2A41hSE [https://perma.cc/YY9L-EPPC]. 
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to targeted sanctions and a loss of foreign investors, Russia adapted by 
finding new trade markets in Asia and Africa and strengthening domestic 
production.107  Ironically, economic analysts now fear the most 
prominent danger to the Russian economy is the U.S. deciding to lift the 
imposed sanctions on Russian individuals.108  If the U.S. lifts sanctions 
against Russia, Russia’s now stabilized economic growth will be shocked 
by the return of foreign capital, disrupting its domestic policies in place 
and currency rate.109 
However, without considering the arguable ineffectiveness of 
targeted sanctions, the HKAA complicates FFIs’ decisions to comply due 
to China’s role as a global power.110  Unlike other countries sanctioned 
by the U.S., China is the only country that can compete with the U.S. in 
terms of economic scale.111  In 2019, China ranked second in real GDP 
at $14.343 trillion to the U.S. at $21.374 trillion.112  As of August 2020, 
China had further decreased the gap with the U.S. economy, with 
estimates showing China's real GDP as approaching $20 trillion.113  
Amongst many other indicators of China’s economic force,114  China is 
projected to reach GDP parity with the U.S. economy in 2028.115  
Due to China’s economic growth and future potential, several 
U.S. companies and FFIs have developed long-term expansion plans into 
 
107. Foy, supra note 107. 
108. Foy, supra note 107. 
109. Foy, supra note 107. 
110. Rennemo, supra note 14. 
111. See Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 138 (discussing the importance of evaluating the 
economic drivers and potential revenue to be earned in China for companies in the long term). 
112. GDP in Current U.S. Dollars 2019, THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=map&year=2019 
[https://perma.cc/8KFD-QW6F] (set chart year to 2019, then scroll down to data table below 
the world chart) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2019]. 
113. Johnathan Cheng, China’s Economy is Bouncing Back—And Graining Ground on the 
U.S., WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-economy-
is-bouncing-backand-gaining-ground-on-the-u-s-11598280917?st=3ld9y7lt2tvvwcy 
[https://perma.cc/58WW-AQS8]. 
114. China became the world’s largest economy in purchasing-power-parity in 2014, 
became the largest trading nation in goods in 2013, has comparable numbers of Global 
Fortune 500 companies as the U.S., and ranks second in receiving and being the source of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 1. 
115. Cheng, supra note 112. (“Homi Kharas, a senior global economics and development 
fellow at the Brookings Institution, said the coronavirus puts China’s economy on track to 
reach parity with the U.S. in 2028 in absolute terms, using current dollars—two years faster 
than his pre-coronavirus estimate.”). 
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China, including Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase & Co.116  McKinsey 
Global Institute estimates that there is $22 trillion to $37 trillion of 
economic value—or 15% to 26% of global GDP by 2040—for global 
investment opportunities depending on the level of engagement between 
China and other nations.117  Despite the downside due to trade tensions, 
the economic investment opportunities due to China’s growth are 
attractive.118  Some of the long-term initiatives for foreign companies in 
China include designating China as a center for global growth or as a 
niche market for China’s strongest economic sectors.119  
The size of the Chinese economy and high interest of U.S.-backed 
companies and foreign institutions in China create a major dilemma for 
global banks with a client base in Hong Kong (notably HSBC, Standard 
Chartered, Citigroup, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase).120  To 
further complicate financial institutions' decisions, China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs announced sanctions on U.S. officials,121 countering the 
HKAA.122  China’s authority for sanctioning U.S. officials is under 
Article 29 of the HKSAR Security Law123 by “forbidding sanctions, 
blockades or hostile activities against the financial hub and China.”124  
China’s HKSAR Security Law turns a bank’s decision to comply with 
 
116. Cathy Chan, How Hong Kong Sanctions Could Threaten Wall Street, BLOOMBERG 
(July 7, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-07/how-hong-
kong-sanctions-could-threaten-wall-street-quicktake?sref=x6qPv4jT 
[https://perma.cc/6MM6-L2HD] (last updated Aug. 11, 2020, 12:32 AM). 
117. Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at viii. 
118. McKinsey recommended that despite continued trade tensions and rising debt, 
“companies would do well to look at the fundamentals of China’s economy, which, in many 
respects, has continued growth momentum. As we noted in chapter 4, the drivers of 
consumption growth, including rising incomes, intergenerational transfers, and Chinese 
consumers’ desire to trade up, may remain solid.” Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 138. 
119. Id. 
120. Isjwara et al., supra note 81. 
121. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on August 10, 2020 (Aug. 10, 
2020), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1805288.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/PP5K-6M9C].  
122. Cathy Chan, Global Banks Risk Breaching China Law by Complying with U.S., 
BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-
09/global-banks-risk-breaching-china-law-by-complying-with-u-s?sref=uo8ONmoB 
[https://perma.cc/SW3R-4EM7]. 
123. HKSAR Security Law, supra note 4 (“imposing sanctions or blockades, or engaging 
in other hostile activities against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the 
People’s Republic of China [is an unlawful offense]”). 
124. Chan, supra note 121. 
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the U.S. sanctions125 into a choice between betting on the growth of the 
U.S. or the Chinese economy.126  Regardless, either decision requires 
global banks to appease both U.S. and Chinese authorities,127 as all of 
these banks are highly connected in the global economy.128   
C.         Banks’ Responses to the HKAA and U.S.-China Tensions 
First, U.S. banks in Hong Kong face direct pressure to end 
business with the individuals sanctioned under the HKAA.129  Despite the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s claim that the HKAA sanctions have 
“no legal status” within the Territory, U.S. financial institutions could 
still face the consequences in the U.S.130  Some lawyers noted that “U.S. 
banks’ foreign subsidiaries that are incorporated overseas are generally 
understood to be non-U.S. entities, which could put them outside 
Washington’s jurisdiction.”131  However, even though foreign branches 
of U.S. banks have been treated as “separate entities” under the Separate 
Entity Doctrine,132 a U.S. bank’s foreign branch is still subject to the laws 
of both the U.S. and the country where it is situated.133  
 
125. Isjwara et al., supra note 81. 
126. See Thomas Hale, Why Trump’s Hong Kong Sanctions are Bad News for Banks, FIN. 
TIMES (Aug. 11, 2020), https://on.ft.com/3iuA6Rw [https://perma.cc/7PL3-BNQL] 
(suggesting how the HKAA creates uncertainty for both U.S. and non-U.S. banks regarding 
how to respond to sanctions, especially given the number of international transactions 
conducted in Hong Kong—and implicitly China—using U.S. dollars). 
127. Isjwara et al., supra note 81. 
128. Cathy Chan et al., Citi, StanChart Eye Accounts of Sanctioned Hong Kong Officials, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2020, 3:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-
10/hong-kong-bankers-move-to-suspend-accounts-after-u-s-sanctions?sref=uo8ONmoB 
[https://perma.cc/T32Z-DPH6]. 
129. Hale, supra note 126. 
130. Thomas Hale, Hong Kong and China Hit Back at US Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 8, 
2020), https://on.ft.com/2DLywMh [https://perma.cc/U5UD-8WQL]. 
131. Hale, supra note 126. 
132. The Separate Entity Doctrine spans several statutes and regulations. See Fed. Res. 
Bd., Meeting between Federal Reserve Board Staff and Representatives of Foreign Banking 
Organizations (July 9, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-
commpublic/Industry_Meeting_20120709.pdf [https://perma.cc/W759-9GRS]. Deposits at 
U.S. foreign branches are non-reservable, non-insured, and subordinated in right of payment 
to domestic deposits. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 204.128; 12 U.S.C. § 1818(m)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 
1221(d)(11)); see also 12 C.F.R. § 211.4; U.C.C. §§ 4-107, 4A-105(a)(2) (AM. L. INST. & 
UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).  
133. 12 C.F.R. § 211.1; Gerard Comizio & Ryan Chiachiere, “Ringfencing” U.S. Bank 
Foreign Branch Deposits: Working Toward a Clearing Understanding of Where Deposits are 
Payable in the Midst of Chaos, 3 Am. U. L. Rev. 249, 251 (2014). 
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Thus, it is not surprising that Citigroup has complied with the 
HKAA sanctions, as it is a U.S. institution.134  Citigroup is also the only 
bank of its prime competitors (Standard Chartered and HSBC) to suspend 
the accounts of the eleven initially sanctioned individuals under the 
HKAA in August 2020.135  Standard Chartered is reviewing relationships 
and monitoring accounts but noted that it would only suspend new 
account openings by HKAA-targeted individuals.136  However, although 
HSBC has claimed to follow the same precautions as Standard Chartered, 
HSBC has been publicly flagged by the U.S. as contributing to the 
Chinese overtaking of Hong Kong.137 
Citigroup is likely required to strictly comply with the HKAA, as 
the Federal Reserve still regulates it under Regulation K,138 and non-
compliance could result in additional penalties for its U.S. branches 
operating internationally.139  Likewise, Citigroup—and other U.S. 
financial institutions that might become subject to HKAA if additional 
persons or corporate entities are added—will require extensive due 
diligence and bank portfolio reviews for involved entities or 
individuals.140  Further, additional diligence will likely impact other 
investors, multinational companies, and any other entities with business 
in Hong Kong.141  The entities' diligence process will likely be extensive 
 
134. Chan et al., supra note 128. 
135. Chan et al., supra note 128. 
136. Chan et al., supra note 128. 
137. Harry Wilson & Alfred Liu, U.S. Blasts HSBC for Siding with China Over Hong 
Kong, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2020, 4:39 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-26/u-s-blasts-hsbc-for-siding-with-
china-over-future-of-hong-kong?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/532J-J73V]. 
138. 12 C.F.R. § 211. Under Regulation K rules, the international operations of U.S. 
banking organizations are still under the authority of the Federal Reserve Board and regulated 
under the Federal Reserve Act, Bank Holding Company Act, and International Banking Act. 
Id.  
139. See Giovanna M. Cinelli et al., Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization: 
Extension and Expansion of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, MORGAN LEWIS (July 28, 2020), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization-
extension-and-expansion-of-the-hong-kong-autonomy-act [https://perma.cc/HVZ7-CGXF] 
(“Given the depth and complexity of financial dealings in Hong Kong, parties operating in 
the city will need to understand even more than previously whether their dealings involve 
parties who are or could be subject to these sanctions, which can impact virtually all 
transactions, including securities trades, equity or debt investments, loans and financings, 
foreign exchange, and other banking activities.”). 
140. Abate & Soliman, supra note 43; see also Cinelli et al., supra note 139. 
141. Cinelli et al., supra note 139 (“For example, dealings with persons or entities in Hong 
Kong will require enhanced due diligence and more detailed examination of individuals and 
entities . . . involved in transactions.”).  
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and include following financial trails of individuals and entities 
associated with sanctioned persons and examining a broad range of assets 
(securities, commodities, derivative instruments) from linked 
transactions.142  Ultimately, the HKAA sanctions create overhead 
expenses for the U.S. banks, as they are required to respond immediately 
and likely will conduct more extensive diligence on Hong Kong and 
Chinese transactions to prepare for a quick exit strategy if necessary.143 
However, FFIs are better able to wait and see how both the Chinese and 
U.S. governments continue to respond before taking drastic action.144  For 
example, Standard Chartered appeased both Chinese and U.S. authorities 
by publicly supporting the Chinese Security Law imposed on Hong 
Kong145 while also avoiding reputational damage from the U.S. by not 
evading the HKAA sanctions.146   
HSBC has chosen an alternative route by electing to ignore the 
risk of HKAA penalties by continuing to support sanctioned 
individuals.147  However, HSBC’s choice not to comply with the U.S. 
sanctions under the HKAA is more than a choice to accept the risk of 
financial penalties as it has been in the past.148  Now, HSBC chooses to 
bet on the investment prospects in China compared to relying on U.S. 
financial systems.149 
HSBC’s choice to support China shows a realization of the 
bargaining asymmetries between the U.S. government and foreign 
banks.150  Unlike with prior targeted sanctions, HSBC realized it has the 
upper hand against the U.S. government, especially since it makes 90% 
 
142. Id. 
143. See id. (“For example, dealings with persons or entities in Hong Kong will require 
enhanced due diligence and more detailed examination of individuals and entities . . . involved 
in transactions.”). 
144. Isjwara et al., supra note 81. 
145. Marion Dakers & Harry Wilson, Hong Kong’s Two British Banks Back Beijing in 
Security Law Fight, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2020, 1:23 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-03/standard-chartered-supports-china-s-
national-security-law?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/MRK7-HJXX].   
146. Wilson & Liu, supra note 136. 
147. Id. 
148. LAWRENCE & MARTIN, supra note 65; see also ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 
(describing compliance with sanctions less as a choice and more as a requirement: “abide by 
the sanctions or risk severe consequences”). 
149. Wilson & Liu, supra note 136. 
150. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 343. 
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of its profit in Asian markets.151  HSBC has been gradually shrinking its 
“struggling operations in Europe and the U.S.”152  For example, HSBC 
already cut 35,000 jobs in its investment bank in the U.S. and Europe 
earlier this year.153  HSBC Chairman Mark Tucker took the position that 
“there was too much political risk not to support Chinese authorities; they 
are the long-term future of Hong Kong, forget everything else.”154 
Unlike Iran or Russia sanctions, the U.S. government does not 
have the bargaining power to control foreign institutions’ that may be 
willing to forego reliance on the U.S. dollar in order to continue investing 
in Chinese growth opportunities.155  Even Standard Chartered has noted 
the shift: “[m]inus our Hong Kong operations, StanChart is non-existent. 
Our usual approach is to aggressively sit on the fence as these are no-win 
issues, but in the past, it has not been a ‘you are with us or else’ 
situation.”156  The revenue potential in China is strong enough that 
foreign banks like HSBC are willing to find workarounds to maintain 
relationships with sanctioned individuals by transacting completely 
outside the U.S. financial system or without correspondent banks based 
in the U.S.157  Further, the U.S. government’s relationship with FFI’s is 
interdependent, which limits the reach of U.S. bargaining power.158   
IV.  FUTURE IMPACTS FROM OVERUSE OF SANCTIONS 
While the HKAA and other recent U.S. political developments 
have undertones of intentional separation from China, if the U.S. 
government maintains a protectionist stance against China, there could 
be negative consequences to the U.S. financial system, such as isolation 
 
151. Stephen Morris & Katrina Manson, Mike Pompeo Renews Attack on HSBC as Bank 
Walks Line Between US and China, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://on.ft.com/3jhHPTz 
[https://perma.cc/5DVG-MGZQ].  
152. Wilson & Liu, supra note 136. 
153. Simon Clark & Margot Patrick, HSBC to Cut 35,000 Jobs and $100 Billion of Assets, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2020, 4:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hsbc-holdings-2019-net-
profit-plunged-53-11582001092 [https://perma.cc/4YP6-BB5N]. 
154. Stephen Morris, Henny Sender, & Laura Noonan, HSBC Wobbles on a Geopolitical 
Tightrope, FIN. INST. (June 9, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/cc35f8e2-83af-4225-826c-
b2d99e51ee5e [https://perma.cc/XUJ7-HD3M]. 
155. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 343. 
156. Morris, et al,, supra note 153. 
157. Hale, supra note 126. 
158. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 343 (“[T]he U.S. government depends on banks like 
HSBC almost as much as such banks depend on U.S. markets. This interdependency 
constrains the government in implementing its various harnessing tactics.”). 
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from key investment markets.159  Even as the executive branch transitions 
from the Trump to Biden administration, many of the economic policies, 
especially regarding China, are expected to remain intact.160 
A.         Disconnect Between U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. Entities  
Economic sanctions are a form of protectionist trade policy161 and 
historically have had negative consequences on the American 
economy.162  For example, in 1930, the U.S. was engaged in protectionist 
trade policies.163  In an attempt to protect U.S. agricultural communities 
from the side effects of industrialization, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act 
 
159. See Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 120 (discussing how protectionist trade policies 
in the past resulted in negative economic consequences spanning the global markets).  
160. John Hilsenrath & Nick Timiraos, Biden’s Economic Team Charts a New Course for 
Globalization, With Trumpian Undertones, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2020, 4:22 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-economic-team-trade-trump-globalization-
11606848311 [https://perma.cc/2VAN-W25R]. Although Biden hopes to carve out a third 
way to work with China—possibly using multilateral trade agreement—Biden is still expected 
to maintain several Trump policies to balance the bipartisan perspective toward taking a tough 
stance with penalties against China. Id. In addition, even if Biden now disagrees tariffs are 
the wrong approach to China, the use of sanctions was still heavily implemented under the 
Obama administration. Id. Ultimately, Biden is expected to focus on getting the “domestic 
house in order” before changing foreign policy or entering into new trade deals. Id; see also 
Ana Swanson, Biden’s China Policy? A Balancing Act for a Toxic Relationship, N.Y. TIMES 




a1 [https://perma.cc/TDP7-4TJ5].  
161. Lily Kuo, Trump’s China Tariffs Risk ‘Tit-for-Tat Protectionism’ that Threatens 
World Economy, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2018, 3:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/mar/22/trump-sanctions-tariffs-china-trade-wars [https://perma.cc/M4TF-
AEA7]; see also Holly Ellyatt, Putin Takes Another Wipe at Protectionism, ‘Sanctions, Bans 
and Political Bias, CNBC (Sept. 12, 2018, 1:48 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/12/putin-takes-another-swipe-at-protectionism-attacks-
sanctions-bans-and-political-bias.html [https://perma.cc/C22K-RW34].  
162. See Robert Z. Lawrence and Robert E. Litan, Why Protectionism Doesn’t Pay, HARV. 
BUS. R. (1987), https://hbr.org/1987/05/why-protectionism-doesnt-pay 
[https://perma.cc/MP5T-3Z5D] (considering how low wages abroad and claims of unfair 
trade practices did not drive the U.S. trade deficit in the 1980s and how protectionist policies 
are costly and harmful to the American economy. 
163. Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 120; Alan Reynolds, The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and 
the Great Depression, CATO INST.  (May 7, 2016, 3:27 PM), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/smoot-hawley-tariff-great-depression [https://perma.cc/JF63-
NX2E]. 
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(“Tariff Act”)164 was passed in 1930.165  While the Tariff Act's passage 
was only one of the precipitating factors of the Great Depression, the 
anticipation of U.S. protectionist policies along with foreign investors’ 
negative sentiments encouraged foreign lenders and investors to 
withdraw from the U.S. markets.166   
Today, investors try to anticipate laws and shifts in political 
policies to minimize the effects on business operations and profit 
margins.167  Investors are already anticipating further U.S. trade 
protectionist policies against China to continue into the Biden 
administration,168 heightened by the U.S.’s passage of the HKAA and 
track record of using FFIs to impose its economic sanctions.169  Although 
the HKAA thus far only sanctions twenty-nine individuals as of 
December 2020,170 there is a fear that the sanctions list could be expanded 
to include up to ninety million people, considering the number of state-
owned Chinese companies and the number of Chinese Communist Party 
members.171  Major U.S. financial institutions have over $71 billion172 in 
exposure to China, and increased sanctions on Chinese individuals and 
entities threaten U.S. banks and their growth plans and potential 
incomes.173  Additional sanctions on China will limit U.S. institutions’ 
 
164. Alternatively called the “Tariff Act of 1930.” Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–
1683 (2018); 19 U.S.C. § 1654 (2018) (Short Title); see also Reynolds, supra note 162. 
165. Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 1. 
166. Reynolds, supra note 162 (“The massive withdrawal of foreign lenders from the 
broker-loan market in early October probably reflected the correctly anticipated decline in the 
value of the collateral for those loans (stocks), and the fear among foreign capitalists that they 
would have to liquidate such assets to stay solvent in a world of high tariffs.  The process 
contributed to the crash as both cause and effect.”). 
167. Id. 
168. Even with the change of executive administration, a tough stance against China is 
expected to continue as Biden intends to focus on “investments into American industry.” 
Swanson, supra note 160. 
169. Chan, supra note 116. 
170. Sanctions List Search, OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Dec. 10, 2020, 10:05 AM), 
https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ (using program code—“HK-EO13936”—which has 
been designated for the HKAA and its accompany executive order) [https://perma.cc/6D8N-
4SRB] (last retrieved Dec. 10, 2020).  
171. Chan, supra note 116. 
172. “The five big U.S. banks had a combined $71 billion of exposure to China in 2019, 
with JPMorgan clocking the biggest investment at $19 billion.” Id. 
173. Chan, supra note 116; see also Bloomberg News, Wall Street Has Billions to Lose in 
China From Rising Strain, BLOOMBERG (May 28, 2020, 5:22 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-28/wall-street-has-billions-to-lose-in-
china-from-mounting-tension?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/2T4R-9BBG]. 
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opportunities while foreign investors gain.174  Goldman Sachs estimates 
that foreign firms are competing for a considerable share of China’s 
brokerage industry, which is expected to hit $47 billion by 2026.175 
Further, the Senate's Congressional Record on the day of the 
HKAA passage indicates the disconnect between the U.S. government 
and U.S. investors regarding how to approach a relationship with 
China.176  Throughout the HKAA, the only mention of financial 
institutions involves using the banks to impose economic sanctions in 
response to China passing the HKSAR Security Law.177  Additionally, 
the Congressional Record of the HKAA emphasizes how the sanctions 
are intended to “penalize[] banks that choose to finance the erosion of 
Hong Kong’s autonomy.”178  This statement emphasizes how 
disconnected the U.S. legislative and executive branches are from what 
U.S. institutions and companies have to lose from these policies179 by 
intentionally ignoring the interconnectivity between China, the U.S., and 
Hong Kong.180 
Protectionist ideas have emanated from U.S. politicians despite 
U.S. companies’ resistance and push forward on Chinese investments.181  
The Trump administration threatened to impose “massive tariffs,”182 
decouple from the Chinese market, and even block U.S. companies that 
outsource jobs to China from receiving federal contracts.183  Although the 
 
174. Chan, supra note 116; see also Bloomberg News, supra note 173. 
175. Chan, supra note 116. 
176. 116 CONG. REC. S4179 (daily ed. July 2, 2020) (statement of Sen. Boozman). 
177. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, 134 Stat. 663 (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EH-
PV6K]. 
178. 116 CONG. REC. S4179. 
179. See Bloomberg News, supra note 173 (discussing the large amounts of exposure—
meaning billions of dollars to lose—U.S. banks have tied to the Chinese economy). 
180. See Chan et al., supra note 128 (quoting a strategy consultant in Hong Kong, who 
suggests that banks would be hard pressed to decide to cut off customers given they have an 
“international footprint that straddles the U.S., Hong Kong, and mainland China”).  
181. Tom Mitchel, US Companies Defy Trump’s Threats about Decoupling from China, 
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://on.ft.com/2DHZy7r [https://perma.cc/UPU5-DYHA]. 
182. Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, The White House (Sept. 7, 2020), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-
conference-september-7-2020/ [https://perma.cc/3UFJ-K7RH] (“Whether it’s decoupling or 
putting in massive tariffs like I’ve been doing already, we’re going to end our reliance on 
China because we can’t rely on China.”). 
183. Id. (“[W]e’ll impose tariffs on companies that desert America to create jobs in China 
and other countries . . . .[and] prohibit federal contracts from companies that outsource to 
China.”). 
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Biden administration is unlikely to impose new sanctions, the current 
policies against China are likely to continue,184 especially as Biden has 
openly expressed taking a strong stance against China.185  In addition, the 
Biden administration will still have to balance the interests of Congress, 
which continues to maintain strong bipartisan support for taking a stance 
against China, citing national security concerns.186  While Biden’s 
approach may differ—for example, by seeking support of European allies 
to increase bargaining power—Biden’s main priority remains the same 
as Trump’s.187  Similar to the Trump administration, Biden’s plan focuses 
on domestic policies and programs to alleviate the economic burdens on 
Americans affected by global trade confrontations.188 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai 
surveyed U.S. businesses and found that the majority of those surveyed 
intend to continue pursuing business interests in China, despite the rising 
tensions in U.S.-China relations.189  Further, some of these businesses 
with interests in China are instead pushing for the Biden administration 
to keep current policies intact to be used as a bargaining point to force 
Chinese concessions on core economic policies.190  Ultimately, economic 
sanctions like the HKAA and the current political tension between the 
U.S. and China are not likely to dissuade either U.S. or international 
financial institutions and companies from forgoing lending and financial 
 
184. Current policies against China are expected to continue especially after the 
appointment of Janet Yellen to Treasury Secretary; one close to the future Treasury Secretary 
expects “the new administration to be reluctant to remove tariffs on China but to explore 
removing tariffs in other areas that affect allies, such as steel and aluminum.” Hilsenrath & 
Timiraos, supra note 160. 
185. Swanson, supra note 160 (“Mr. Biden has said the United States must get ‘tough with 
China,’ and referred to Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader, as a ‘thug.’”).  
186. Swanson, supra note 160. 
187. Hilsenrath & Timiraos, supra note 160. 
188. Id. (“Biden has signaled he wants to push allies for help confronting China and press 
for more aggressive programs domestically to help Americans hurt by trade . . .”); see also 
Swanson, supra note 160 (“Mr. Biden promised to make significant investments into 
American industry, including $300 billion in technology industries that he said would create 
three million “good-paying” jobs, as well as channeling more government dollars into 
purchasing American products like automobiles and pharmaceuticals.”). 
189. Einhorn, supra note 19; Thomas Hale et al., Vanguard Uproots Staff from Hong Kong 
to Focus on Shanghai, FIN.  TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/46683cde-
9707-4023-9378-52e6491f8817 [https://perma.cc/YUS9-ELMB].  
190. Hilsenrath & Timiraos, supra note 160. 
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opportunities in China.191  However, the use of sanction actions such as 
the HKAA, which will likely continue given the bipartisan support of the 
protectionist foreign policy agenda,192 could have negative implications 
on the U.S. financial system, as international financial institutions attempt 
to de-risk from the U.S. economy.193 
 
B.         De-risking from the U.S. Markets and Possible Long-Term  
            Impact  
 
If the U.S. continues to use foreign banks to impose economic 
sanctions, it could lead foreign institutions to de-risk from the U.S. by 
pursuing relationships in other countries.194  Continued challenges with 
U.S. regulations, along with increased growth in China, could create 
shifts that weaken the dollar’s dominance as the world currency.195  
Finally, the overuse of sanctions and disengagement with China could 
tarnish future relationships with developing countries.196  This approach 
could weaken U.S. bargaining position later in the twenty-first century as 
many developing countries take a larger role in the global economy.197  
1.  U.S. Economic Sanctions Causing Banks to De-risk 
The U.S. Department of State defines “de-risking” as “the 
phenomenon of financial institutions terminating or restricting business 
 
191. See Einhorn, supra note 19 (citing a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Shanghai that reports that 75% of companies do not intend to relocate out of China, despite 
Trump’s remarks). 
192. Even as the United States shifts to the Biden administration, there is strong bipartisan 
support for continuing a tough stance against Chinese economic policies and trade actions. 
Swanson, supra note 160 (“Congress is also relatively unified on taking a tough stance on 
China. Hundreds of China-related bills are circulating, including several bipartisan efforts that 
echo Mr. Biden’s emphasis on competing with China by investing in American industries like 
quantum computing and artificial intelligence.”); see also Dave Michaels & Alexander 
Osipovich, Congress Sets Stage for Exiling Chinese Stocks from U.S. Over Audit Dispute, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-sets-stage-for-exiling-
chinese-stocks-from-u-s-over-audit-dispute-11606946071 [https://perma.cc/8VF8-6YEP] 
(noting that legislation in response to Chinese trade concerns continue to pass unanimously).  
193.  ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 36. 
194. Financial institutions have begun de-risking from the United States in the past in 
response to sanctions on Iran and Russia, so I propose this will definitely continue with China. 
ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35. 
195. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35; see also infra Part VI.B.2. 
196. Rennemo, supra note 14; see infra Part VI.B.3.  
197. Leslie McCullough, AidData Sheds Light on Chinese Foreign Aid, WM & MARY (July 
8, 2020), https://www.wm.edu/news/stories/2020/aiddata-sheds-light-on-chinese-foreign-
aid.php [https://perma.cc/MQ4T-9TV3]; See infra Part VI.B.3. 
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relationships with clients or categories of clients to avoid, rather than 
manage risk.”198  As a response to increasing threats of economic sanction 
penalties, U.S. financial institutions and FFIs have begun de-risking their 
portfolios from clients in countries seen as high-risk for sanction 
violations.199  A major component of de-risking is reducing “foreign 
correspondent banking accounts.”200  These accounts act like several of 
the banks in Hong Kong—foreign banks operating in one country 
maintain accounts at a U.S. financial institution to allow clients to 
conduct U.S. dollar transactions.201  Because banks can be found to have 
violated U.S. economic sanctions without explicit knowledge—and only 
need to be connected to an individual who has “materially 
contributed”202—financial institutions have begun to terminate links to 
foreign bank accounts where they lack direct oversight over violating 
transactions.203  
Rather than managing risk with targeted countries and individuals 
in order to comply with the U.S. sanctions, many U.S. and foreign banks 
have terminated thousands of corresponding banking relationships across 
various countries since the increase in the use of economic sanctions.204  
Surveys by both the World Bank205 and the U.K. Financial Conduct 
Authority206 found that banks would rather eliminate entire classes of 
 
198. De-risking, THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/de-risking/ 
[https://perma.cc/9RVY-BDB7] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
199. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35. 
200. Julie Copeland & Mirella DeRose, The Risks of De-Risking, PROGRAM ON CORP. 




202. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, § 5(a), 134 Stat. 663, 666 (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EH-
PV6K]. 
203. See Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (“[H]eightened enforcement actions 
combined with stricter financial regulations and considerations of profitability are causing 
large banks to avoid rather than assess actual financial risk by limiting or eliminating entire 
classes of customers based on country and product line.”); see also ROSENBERG ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 35. 
204. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35. 
205. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (citing Fact Finding Summary from De-risking 
Surveys, THE WORLD BANK (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-
reports/documentdetail/534371468197058296/fact-finding-summary-from-de-risking-
surveys [https://perma.cc/Y9H9-SJCG]).  
206. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (citing David Artingstall et al., Drivers and 
Impacts of Derisking, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Feb. 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/research/drivers-impacts-of-derisking [https://perma.cc/M2VL-3DZ5]). 
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customers from targeted countries than comply with stricter regulations 
and heightened sanctions enforcement.207  The sanctions have 
encouraged both U.S. companies and FFIs to avoid transacting with entire 
bodies of people from sanctioned regions such as the Middle East, Latin 
America, and Africa.208  This approach could exclude many foreign 
investors from the U.S. financial markets209 and eventually weaken the 
dollar as the primary international exchange currency.210   
De-risking has not gone unnoticed by the U.S. government.211  Its 
major concern is that de-risking reduces the force of sanctions to compel 
behavior against a targeted country.212  Banks have considerable 
influence over private actors and cross-border connections.213  With 
limited access to foreign correspondent transactions, the U.S. government 
loses transparency and authority over foreign financial networks.214 
In 2014, the U.S. Treasury acknowledged the effects of 
institutions terminating relationships to reduce their risk of penalties.215  
In an attempt to deter financial institutions from “de-risking” and 
emphasize the importance of global banking relationships, the Treasury 
and the federal banking agencies issued a Joint Fact Sheet on Foreign 
Correspondent Banking (“Joint Fact Sheet”).216  This press release 
outlined expectations, enforcement actions, and penalties under programs 
 
207. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200. 
208. Thomas Baxter, Compliance – Some Thoughts About Reaching the Next Level, THE 
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Feb. 9, 2015), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/bax020915, 
[https://perma.cc/C9P3-4LZF]. 
209. See Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (noting that funds may go “underground,” 
out of financial institution’s oversight). 
210. Baxter, supra note 208. 
211. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (referring to senior U.S. government members—
like David Cohen,  former CIA Deputy Director and Treasury Under Secretary—who have 
declared de-risking a top priority and policy concern). 
212. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35. 
213. Id. 
214. Id.; see also Joint Fact Sheet on Foreign Correspondent Banking: Approach to 
BSA/AML and OFAC Sanctions Supervision and Enforcement, THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE 




215. See Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (referring to a speech by U.S. Treasury 
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen who “addresses 
concerns about de-risking was one of the Department of Treasury’s top policy objectives”).  
216. THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY AND FED. BANKING AGENCIES, supra note 214.  
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such as economic sanctions administered by the Treasury’s OFAC217—
i.e., the entity enforcing HKAA.218  The Joint Fact Sheet emphasizes that 
most financial institutions identified for penalties from continued 
connection to a sanctioned individual usually correct the unlawful action 
before penalties or enforcement occurs.219  Additionally, the Joint Fact 
Sheet emphasized that the penalties for violating OFAC sanctions 
involved sustained patterns or major violations by financial institutions 
and not unintentional mistakes or unintentional evasion of the 
sanctions.220   
2.  De-risking Leading to Potential Decline in Dollar Dominance 
Despite the government’s attempts to reduce de-risking, the U.S. 
has continued to impose economic sanctions.221  Continued use of 
targeted economic sanctions for U.S. foreign policy will further 
encourage FFIs to de-risk to avoid the sanctions violation penalties and 
harm to reputation.222  De-risking could gradually reduce the dollar as a 
currency of choice.223 
Although a dramatic shift away from the U.S. as the key market 
for investment and currency transactions is unlikely, responses to the 
tension between the U.S. and China suggest investors and foreign banks 
are gradually shifting away from complete dependence on the U.S. as a 
financial center.224  For example, HSBC already removed a large portion 
 
217. Id. (noting the federal banking agencies included FDIC NCUA, OCC, FRB). 
218. Id. 
219. See id. (“The vast majority (about 95%) of BSA/OFAC compliance deficiencies 
identified . . .are corrected by the institution’s management without the needed for any 
enforcement action or penalty.”).  
220. Id. 
221. Since 2016, the United States has continued to sanction numerous countries 
individually and under groups of foreign policy sanctions programs. Sanctions Programs and 
Country Information, THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information 
[https://perma.cc/U877-QNAG] (last retrieved Oct. 23, 2020) (listing multiple sanctions 
programs since the issuance of the Joint Fact sheet on de-risking in 2016).  
222. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35; Baxter, supra note 208 (“Even the size of 
penalties for violations, and the potential reputational damage associated with this business, 
it is very difficult to quarrel with the business judgment [of de-risking]”).  
223. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200. 
224. Weizhen Tan, The Dollar May Slide Further, but Analysts Say its Demise is ‘Greatly 
Exaggerated’, CNBC (Aug. 23, 2020, 7:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/24/us-
dollar-still-unrivaled-as-global-reserve-currency-versus-yuan-euro.html 
[https://perma.cc/3EP7-3FBZ]. 
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of its U.S. operations in early 2020, and analysts have commented that 
the chance of HSBC keeping U.S. operations is more unlikely after the 
passage of the HKAA.225  Further, the strength of the dollar has been 
called into question by several investment analysts and strategists.226  
Blackrock strategists expect the dollar’s weakness to persist, making its 
prominence uncertain in the long-term.227  However, other economists 
consider the possibility of the dollar’s decline as overdramatized and that 
the dollar’s status as the global currency is paramount to either the yuan 
or euro.228  
In light of recent trends in Chinese growth, a gradual shift away 
from the dollar during this century should not be wholly dismissed,229 
especially as the euro and yuan could balance out exchange reserves.230  
The Chinese government is expanding the scope of its capital markets to 
allow for more foreign investors.231  U.S. companies and investment 
funds continue to look towards China as a major growth opportunity, 
even as the conflict between the two countries continues.232  
 
225. Chad Bray & Enoch You, Does HSBC Need Its US Business? Bank Says Yes, Some 
Investors Call for a Break-up, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 3, 2020, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3099942/does-hsbc-need-its-us-
business-bank-says-yes-some [https://perma.cc/A3JW-54PH]. 
226. Tan, supra note 224.  
227. Id. 
228. Id.  
229. Evelyn Cheng, Global Funds Invest More in China as Coronavirus Spreads to the 
Rest of the World, CNBC (May 13, 2020, 8:26 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/14/global-funds-invest-more-in-china-as-coronavirus-
spreads-to-the-world.html [https://perma.cc/X9LZ-YP2E] (“[E]ven at lower levels of growth, 
going to be the dominant, the super majority driver of growth (over the) next 10 years.”). 
230. See Saqib Iqbal Ahmed, U.S. Dollar’s Woes are Only Beginning, Some Bears Say, 
THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2020, 4:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-markets-
dollar-analysis-idUSKBN25S3KN [https://perma.cc/Z4TR-T96T]; see also Mark Gilbert & 
Marcus Ashworth, A Currency War Is the Last Thing the World Needs, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 
2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-03/euro-v-dollar-a-
currency-war-is-the-last-thing-the-world-needs?sref=x6qPv4jT [https://perma.cc/JC5L-
V8JE]; Frank Ting, Chinese Yuan to Become No. 3 Global Currency by 2030 after US Dollar, 
Euro, Morgan Stanley Predicts, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 8, 2020, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3100575/chinese-yuan-become-no-
3-global-currency-2030-after-us-dollar [https://perma.cc/6H34-N24D]. 
231. Luoyan Liu & Meg Shen, China Expands Investment Scope for Foreign Investors 




232. Andrew Browne, Bloomberg New Economy: Fund Managers Are Rushing Into China, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2020, 6:45 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2020-09-12/bloomberg-new-economy-fund-
2021] CHINA AND TARGETED SANCTIONS 559 
Additionally, the U.S. sanction-heavy strategy has encouraged 
companies to safeguard against future sanctions by increasing 
compliance efforts and attempting to avoid the U.S. financial system.233  
One recent trend in terms of sanctions is the increased use of alternative 
currency clauses to minimize risk in case a party becomes subject to U.S. 
sanctions.234  China and Hong Kong’s institutions have also begun hiring 
more regulatory and compliance lawyers in light of the U.S. sanctions 
and Chinese security laws.235  The increase of compliance operations 
could be a response to avoid U.S. sanctions and bypass the U.S. financial 
system going forward, which could decrease the dollar’s dominance in 
the long term.236  There is no question that the dollar dominates 
international exchange markets.237  However, the dollar’s future as a key 
foreign policy bargaining tool is not guaranteed if the U.S. uses economic 
sanctions to coerce allies and separate them from China.238   
3.  Long-Term Impact on U.S. Relationships with Allies and 
Developing Countries 
The use of U.S. sanctions and gradual de-risking from the U.S. as 
the center of global capital markets can potentially impact other 
international relationships with European countries and developing 
 
managers-are-rushing-into-china?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/F5EL-MCDU]; see 
also Cheng, supra note 229 (noting that investors are seeking to increase investments in 
China, despite COVID-19 and trade war turmoil).  
233. Jason Hungerford et al., Issues Arising for Financial Institutions and Regulated 




234. The “alternative currency clauses” designate foreign currency outside of USD to use 
in anticipating possible sanctions from the U.S. government. See id. (“The purpose of 
alternative currency clauses is usually to obviate U.S. primary sanctions risk in the event a 
party or a transaction becomes subject to U.S. sanctions.”). 
235. Alun John & Sumeet Chatterjee, Hong Kong Financial Firms Step Up Compliance 
Hiring Amid U.S. Sanctions, Security Law, THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2020, 4:55 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/hongkong-security-finance-idUSKBN25V068 
[https://perma.cc/D9SL-2VHC]. 
236. John & Chatterjee, supra note 235; see also Baxter, supra note 208 (discussing how 
the role of the U.S. dollar as “the international medium of exchange” can lead to different 
compliance risks, which can lead “U.S. correspondent banks [] to ‘de-risk’”).  
237. Tan, supra note 224.  
238. See Rennemo, supra note 14 (discussing how the dollar currently dominates “88 
percent of foreign exchange transactions . . . [however] the dollar’s position is not pre-
ordained”).  
560 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 25 
countries.239  U.S. politicians have recognized these risks and expressed 
concerns about the overuse of sanctions.240  Economic sanctions like the 
HKAA are only successful when U.S. goals align with or are widely 
accepted by foreign governments and institutions.241  However, now that 
the sanctions target China, other countries are less willing to comply with 
the U.S. and abandon efforts in China, as they consider the role of the 
Chinese economy in their countries’ futures.242 
First, European allies have grown increasingly concerned over 
the U.S.’ use of economic sanctions and “abusing its hegemonic 
privileges.”243  In 2015, the “weaponization of finance” by the U.S. was 
considered a top risk in politics and in foreign markets.244  Further, the 
risks of a decoupling between the U.S. and China and the political 
tensions between the two countries were ranked as two of the top five 
geopolitical risks threatening the global economy in 2020.245  The 
weaponization of global trade amplifies much of this tension.246  The risk 
of the tensions between China and the U.S. not only threatens a $5 trillion 
technology industry, but a great decoupling would force countries to 
choose between a side on a “virtual Berlin Wall,” which risks creating a 
 
239. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13 (“Political risk analysts have predicted that 
this ‘weaponization of finance’ could trigger a politically motivated diversification away from 
U.S. capital markets and the dollar.”). 
240. Id.  
241. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 342. 
242. Rennemo, supra note 14. 
243. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13 (discussing how initiatives like BRICS—
a group of developing countries called upon by Vladimir Putin—have emerged in response to 
the U.S.’s “weaponization of finance” and can lead other allies to question the U.S.’s misuse 
of this financial power).  
244. Eurasia Group Publishes Top Risks 2015, EURASIA GROUP (Jan. 5, 2015), 
https://www.eurasiagroup.net/media/eurasia-group-publishes-top-risks-2015 
[https://perma.cc/7BD7-FLNF] (“The weaponization of finance: To achieve foreign policy 
goals without military might, Washington is weaponizing finance on a new scale. It is using 
carrots (access to capital markets) and sticks (varied types of sanctions) as tools of coercive 
diplomacy. But this strategy will damage relations with allies, particularly in Europe, and US 
companies will find themselves caught in the crossfire between Washington and sanctioned 
states.”). 
245. Ian Bremmer & Cliff Kupchan, Top Risks 2020: Coronavirus Edition, EURASIA 
GROUP at 7 (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/upload/top_risks_2020_coronavirus_edition_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WN4A-RE9V]. 
246. Ian Bremmer & Cliff Kupchan, Risk 2: The Great Decoupling, EURASIA GROUP (Jan 
6, 2020), https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/risk-2-great-decoupling 
[https://perma.cc/6RJZ-N2BE]. 
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rigid divide in investments, financial services, and several other 
industries.247  
Ultimately, the use of targeted sanctions to weaponize the U.S. 
capital market has grown to be seen as a form of “coercive diplomacy” 
over the past several years.248  Forcing European countries to choose sides 
will likely “damage relations with allies, particularly in Europe, and U.S. 
companies will find themselves caught in the crossfire between 
Washington and sanctioned states.”249  Effects of the U.S. attempting to 
pressure European allies by using sanctions have already emerged as 
European leaders have announced efforts to stand on their own against 
China.250  Although European and Chinese trade relationships are equally 
filled with feelings of distrust and tensions,251  Europe has taken strategic 
steps to manage its position with China rather than take the U.S. approach 
towards decoupling.252  Ultimately, Europe understands the need to 
cooperate with China to achieve Europe’s economic goals253 and has not 
 
247. Bremmer & Kupchan, supra note 246. 
248. EURASIA GROUP, supra note 244; see also Rennemo, supra note 14 (discussing how 
the U.S. dependence on sanctions is unhealthy and its use of sanctions against China is an 
example of “coercive diplomacy”).  
249. See EURASIA GROUP, supra note 244.  
250. Echoing thoughts against relying on countries such as the United States in dealing 
with China, Merkel claimed “we Europeans must really take fate into our own hands.” Dan 
Baer, Europe and China’s ‘Virtual Summit’, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Sept. 
17, 2020), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/17/europe-and-china-s-virtual-summit-
pub-82750 [https://perma.cc/K2TF-79Q4]. Similar reactions have been expressed by the 
French Minister of State for European Affairs, claiming “Europeans know that they must once 
again speak the language of power, without losing sight of the grammar of cooperation.”  Id. 
251. Janka Oertel, The New China Consensus: How Europe is Growing Wary of Beijing, 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 7, 2020), 
https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_new_china_consensus_how_europe_is_gro
wing_wary_of_beijing [https://perma.cc/9NT9-3652].  
252. Europe seeks to “diversify” from China rather than “decouple.” Andreas Kluth, 
Opinion, Europe Just Declared Independence from China, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 5, 2020, 1:00 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-05/europe-just-declared-
independence-from-china?sref=x6qPv4jT [https://perma.cc/B9VH-KSBL]. 
253. See Kluth, supra note 252 (discussing how some European countries like Germany 
have not responded to the U.S. calls to “decouple” from China, especially since European 
countries realize that “they must also seek Chinese cooperation wherever necessary to 
solve global problems, from climate change to the next pandemic”); see also Joshua Mitnick, 
Why the U.S. Can’t Get Israel to Break Up with China, FOREIGN POLICY (June 16, 2020), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/16/us-israel-china-deals/ [https://perma.cc/8QEY-TKHY] 
(“Israel sees China as an opportunity.”). 
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been pushed away from China through the U.S.’ use of trade tactics like 
economic sanctions.254 
Finally, the continued overuse of targeted economic sanctions 
under policies like the HKAA could limit the U.S.’s bargaining power 
with developing countries in the twenty-first century.255  This is 
especially concerning as countries like China are beginning to become 
immunized from potential impacts from sanctions,256 form coalitions 
with other sanctioned countries,257 and invest in developing markets—for 
example, China’s Belt and Road Initiative258—from which U.S. and 
western banks have attempted to de-risk.259  
Even if the U.S. does not target a developing country directly, 
many emerging markets are affected indirectly—"becoming poorer and 
more marginalized”260—as financial institutions withdraw from areas 
seen as too risky to chance penalties for not complying with U.S. 
 
254. Rennemo, supra note 14; see Andrew Michta, Can China Turn Europe Against 
America, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-china-
turn-europe-against-america-11600013768 [https://perma.cc/7X6Z-EKWW] (arguing that 
China may be able to win Europe over because the U.S. “has not been able to convince 
Europeans to see Beijing as anything more dangerous than an economic problem set”). Also 
note that the U.S. has also had difficulty getting European Countries to support the imposition 
of sanctions on other countries like Iran this year. Adam Payne, Mike Pompeo Accused 
European Allies of ‘Siding with the Ayatollahs’ After They Refused to Back Trump on Iran, 
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-
mike-pompeo-accuses-european-allies-iran-ayotollahs-2020-8 [https://perma.cc/95AA-
QRK9]. 
255. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13. 
256. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 36. 
257. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13 (“Russian president Vladimir Putin called upon 
the other leaders from the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa] grouping of 
developing economies to develop ‘a system of measures that would help prevent the 
harassment of countries that do not agree with some foreign policy decisions made by the 
U.S. and their allies.’”).  
258. Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-
massive-belt-and-road-initiative [https://perma.cc/T3HN-HKBG] (“For Xi, the [Belt and 
Road Initiative] serves as pushback against the much-touted U.S. ‘pivot to Asia,’ as well as a 
way for China to develop new investment opportunities, cultivate export markets, and boost 
Chinese incomes and domestic consumption. ‘Under Xi, China now actively seeks to shape 
international norms and institutions and forcefully asserts its presence on the global stage.’”). 
259. THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R40361, CHINA’S FOREIGN AID ACTIVITIES IN 
AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (Feb. 25, 2009), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40361.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7CT-Q96B]; Matt Ferchen, How 
China is Reshaping International Development, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE 
(Jan. 8, 2020), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/how-china-is-reshaping-
international-development-pub-80703 [https://perma.cc/6AZ8-93PL]. 
260. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200. 
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sanctions.261  In addition, the U.S. sanctions have the potential to impact 
almost every non-western region, especially as its list of sanctioned 
individuals grows.262  Simultaneously, China continues to finance and 
strengthen international relations with countries that the U.S. has 
historically shunned.263  Further, by continuing to target China through 
policies such as the HKAA, China may interpret sanctions actions to 
mean that the U.S. does not consider the Chinese economy to be on an 
equal playing field, which ultimately could affect the U.S.’ bargaining 
power in foreign policy and restrict access to China as it emerges as a 
new center of the global economy.264  
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Ultimately, the threat to freedom of speech and civil liberties in 
Hong Kong is concerning.265  However, the U.S. legislative and executive 
branches’ quick and haphazard response to a geopolitical phenomenon 
stemmed from the fear of an ideological position and did not consider the 
long-term impacts on the U.S. financial sector in a globalized 
economy.266  While the short-term impacts of the HKAA alone are still 
emerging, the continued disconnect between U.S. legislators and 
investors regarding foreign policy towards China could undermine the 
 
261. Id. 
262. See Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, OFF. OF FOREIGN 
ASSETS CONTROL (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnlist.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/69FG-NLV9] (noting there are thousands of individuals on the SDN list 
across multiple countries).  
263. Between 2000 and 2014, the U.S. and China were almost equal in government 
financing to other countries—including loans for infrastructure development and other 
projects. China is estimated to have provided $354 billion and the U.S. at $370 billion; many 
of the countries which China has funded have been deemed threats to the United States and 
have been sanctioned by the United States in the past. McCullough, supra note 197.   
264. McCullough, supra note 197 (quoting Samantha Custer, Director of AidData’s Policy 
Analysis; “If we don’t create space for an emerging China to be at the table as an equal player, 
then they will continue to work around prevailing international rules with limited 
transparency”).  
265. See SUSAN V. LAWRENCE AND MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., R46473, 
CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR HONG KONG: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2020) 
(discussing the reasoning behind the United States’ concern regarding the HKSAR Security 
Law and the threat to the freedom of speech in Hong Kong).  
266. Regarding the “quick and haphazard response of the U.S. government,” See 116 
CONG. REC. S4179 (daily ed. July 2, 2020) (statement of Sen. Boozman); see also ROSENBERG 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 34 (discussing the role of financial institutions and potential impacts 
to the U.S. economy as a result of the sanctions).  
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U.S. position as a financial powerhouse in the twenty-first century.267  
Thus, rather than relying on the U.S. markets and dollar as its bargaining 
token, the U.S. should consider improving multilateral trade initiatives 
and improving engagement with China before it self-isolates from some 





267. See Rennemo, supra note 14 (regarding using sanctions and coercive diplomacy, the 
U.S. risks high political costs, losing allies, and economic risks when taking on China).  
268. See Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 132 (“More engagement with China could offer 
opportunities to rapidly commercialize technologies especially in emerging areas such as A.I. 
by gaining access to China’s large user base and vast digital ecosystem, both of which are 
expanding rapidly.”). 
* Thank you to my family, friends, and fiancé for all your support throughout the law school 
experience and continued encouragement during the writing of this Note.  Also, I would like 
to thank Professor Lissa L. Broome, John Fallon, Chase Ponder, Ricky Willi, Thomas Walls, 
and the staff members of the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal for all their time and 
contributions during the entire process. 
